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ABSTRACT 
Modern malware and spyware platforms attack existing antivirus solutions and even Microsoft 
PatchGuard. To protect users and business systems, new technologies developed by Intel and 
AMD CPUs may be applied. To deal with the new malware we propose monitoring and 
controlling access to the memory in real time using Intel VT-x with EPT. We have checked this 
concept by developing MemoryMonRWX, which is a bare-metal hypervisor. MemoryMonRWX is 
able to track and trap all types of memory access: read, write, and execute. MemoryMonRWX 
also has the following competitive advantages: fine-grained analysis, support of multi-core CPUs 
and 64-bit Windows 10. MemoryMonRWX is able to protect critical kernel memory areas even 
when PatchGuard has been disabled by malware. Its main innovative features are as follows: 
guaranteed interception of every memory access, resilience, and low performance degradation. 
Keywords: memory protection; tracking memory access; information leakage; kernel integrity; 
hypervisor 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern malware attacks on Windows 
machines are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and extremely difficult to detect. 
Newest integrated security mechanisms on the 
modern Windows 10 x64 such as Kernel Mode 
Code Signing (KMCS) and Kernel Patch 
Protection (KPP) , also known as PatchGuard, 
are unable to prevent malicious activity. 
Modern malware attacks are 'surgical' and 
infect networks of huge organizations even 
when their computers, have never been 
connected to the Internet 'air-gapped' 
computers' (Paganini, 2014). Let us consider 
some recent incidents with the following 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
malware: Turla rootkit, which remained 
undiscovered for at least three years and 
ProjectSauron, which has never been stored on 
a disk. 
According to the security response by 
Symantec, Turla trojan which was created by 
the W aterbug hackers group successfully 
compromised more than 4,500 computers from 
100 countries (Symantec, 2016). Even the 
Swiss Federal Department of Defense 
(GovCERT, 2016) was under a cyber-
espionage attack via Turla (Paganini, 2016). 
This malware remained undiscovered for at 
least three years due to its stealth features, 
which helped to overcome both built-in 
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